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Summary 
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has ambitious goals for its power projection capabilities. Aside 
from preparing for the possibility of using force to resolve Beijing’s territorial claims in East Asia, it 
is also charged with protecting China’s expanding “overseas interests.” These national objectives 
require the PLA to be able to project significant combat power beyond China’s borders. To meet 
these needs, the PLA is building organic logistics support capabilities such as large naval auxiliaries 
and transport aircraft. But it is also turning to civilian enterprises to supply its transportation needs. 
Since 2012, the PLA has taken major steps to improve its ability to leverage civilian carriers as part 
of the strategic projection support forces in support of military operations. It has developed strategic 
projection support ship fleets, comprising civilian-operated roll-on/roll-off, container, tanker, and 
semi-submersible ships. It has also integrated civilian aviation enterprises into strategic projection 
support aircraft fleets. To facilitate the staging of military forces for projection beyond China’s 
borders, the PLA has improved its ability to use China’s modern rail networks and trucking fleet. The 
PLA has also developed its first strategic projection base, a specialized center of logistics expertise 
intended to serve PLA power projection requirements through civil-military fusion. To be sure, 
China’s strategic projection support forces must overcome several challenges before they can fully 
meet the needs of the PLA. In some cases, training is lax and national defense standards are outdated, 
or not fully implemented. The PLA itself, which is currently in the midst of a major reform, must 
also improve its ability to integrate civilian carriers into its combat and support operations. However, 
the PLA is already taking steps to overcome these challenges, and the PLA logistics community is 
energetically developing new approaches to better leverage China’s enormous civil transportation 
sector to meet Beijing’s current and future power projection requirements. 
Introduction 
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has undergone significant transformation over the past several 
years through reforms enacted by Chairman Xi Jinping. Accompanying major changes in senior 
leadership, organization, and force structure are growing efforts by the PLA to boost its power 
projection capabilities. Much analysis of Chinese military development tends to focus on the 
emblematic platforms of long-range power projection: large warships and military aircraft.1  
But the PLA also relies on civilian carriers—ships, airplanes, trains, and trucks—to support its power 
projection needs. Since the 18th Party Congress (November 2012), the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) has taken major steps to improve its ability to leverage civilian carriers to serve the Chinese 
military. This is an important, but understudied, aspect of China’s military development.  
This report seeks to help close this gap in the literature. It examines efforts by the PLA to strengthen 
what it calls “new-type strategic projection forces.”2 Aside from the PLA’s own organic lift 
capabilities, this includes civilian transport systems and platforms that could be leveraged in a crisis 
or conflict. Much of this effort has been aimed at improving the PLA’s ability to project power over 
water and across long distances—to the frontiers of Chinese-claimed territory in maritime East Asia, 
and to countries and oceans around the world where Chinese “overseas interests” are concentrated. 
                                                          
1 Annual Report to Congress – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019, pp. 
58-62, https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf. 
2 我军新型战略投送力量建设取得长足发展 [“Major Progress Made in Construction of Our Military’s New-type 
Strategic Projection Forces”], 中国国防报 [China Defense News], 16 August 2017, 
https://news.qq.com/a/20170816/010864.htm. 




These developments therefore have huge implications for the U.S. and its allies and partners in this 
period of growing great power competition.  
This report comprises four main parts. Part 1 introduces the PLA concept of strategic projection and 
the drivers behind the PLA’s recent prioritization of strategic power projection force development. 
Part 2 outlines the legal and organizational foundations for PLA employment of civilian carriers for 
military purposes. Part 3—the bulk of the report—describes force development in strategic sea lift, 
strategic airlift, rail and road projection, and strategic projection bases, focusing heavily on support 
capabilities derived from civilian carriers. The report concludes with a discussion of challenges the 
PLA must overcome before it can fully leverage civilian carriers to achieve the power projection 
capabilities it desires. 
China’s Strategic Power Projection Needs 
The PLA defines “strategic power projection” (战略投送) as “actions to comprehensively use a 
variety of transportation forces to insert forces into an area of operations or crisis in order to achieve 
specific strategic objectives.”3 These transportation forces include organic PLA transportation 
supporting forces, such as PLA Air Force (PLAAF) Y-20 transport aircraft or the PLA Navy’s 
(PLAN) Type-071 Landing Platform Dock (LPD) vessels. They also comprise national civilian 
transportation resources—the focus of this report.  
Strategic projection capabilities are vital to the success of any likely military scenario involving 
China. In East Asia, the PLA must be prepared to project power over water in order to seize and 
defend disputed islands, including Taiwan. To achieve these aims, the PLA could be asked to fight 
what it calls an “informatized limited war” (信息化局部战争—sometimes translated as 
“informatized local war”).4 It must also be prepared for a range of other combat operations along its 
periphery, including an intervention in North Korea.  
But China’s interests are not confined to maritime East Asia. The need to defend China’s expanding 
“overseas interests” (海外利益) is often cited as a key driver behind efforts to augment the PLA’s 
ability to project power over long distances.5 China’s overseas interests include the security of 
Chinese citizens and property in foreign lands and the security of sea lines of communication.6 
Indeed, experts in the PLA are increasingly advocating for the improvement of “cross-border, 
transoceanic long-range projection capabilities” (跨境越洋远程投送能力).7 
                                                          
3 This report will hereafter shorten the term to “strategic projection.” 中国人民解放军军语 [PLA Dictionary of Military 
Terms] (Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press, 2011), p. 58.  
4 M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s New Military Strategy: ‘Winning Informatized Local Wars,’” China Brief, Vol. 15, Issue 13, 
July 2, 2015, https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-new-military-strategy-winning-informationized-local-wars/  
5 寿晓松 [Shou Xiaosong, ed.], 战略学 [The Science of Military Strategy], (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013), p. 259. 
6 See section three in “Fulfilling the Missions and Tasks of China’s Armed Forces in the New Era” in 新时代的中国国防 
[China’s National Defense in the New Era], 国务院新闻办公室 [State Council Information Office], July 2019.  
7 刘嘉生, 孙大同, 彭富兵 [Liu Jiasheng, Sun Datong, and Peng Fubing], 基于国家安全需求的战略投送载运工具建设 
[“Development of Carriers for Strategic Projection in Response to National Security Needs”], 军事交通学院学报 
[Journal of Military Transportation University], no. 2, (2019), p. 10; In 2018, two senior captains from the Nanjing Naval 
Command College included “transoceanic projection” in their effort to define the PLAN’s future development strategy. 
See: 史常勇，陈炎 [Shi Changyong and Chen Yan] 试论新时代海军战略定位 [“On the Navy’s Strategic Positioning in 
the New Era”] 国防 [National Defense] no. 5 (2018), pp. 34-36.    




Power projection capabilities also serve valuable strategic purposes even when they are not used. 
Demonstrating the ability to project power beyond China’s borders helps influence the strategic 
calculus of foreign decision makers. It is therefore integral to deterrence, crisis control, and war 
prevention, and maintenance of the initiative in almost any scenario.8 
China’s strategic projection needs are not static. Indeed, they seem to be increasing on the basis of an 
explicit timeline. This timeline was outlined by the chief of staff of the Central Military 
Commission’s (CMC) Transport and Projection Bureau Liu Jiasheng in a February 2019 article.9 Liu 
describes three phases: 
 In the short-term, the military must be ready to fight and win an informatized limited war in 
the maritime direction. To this end, the PLA will focus on greater development of strategic 
sea and air lift forces. Efforts will include implementing technological advancements in self-
loading trucks, fast passenger roll-on/roll-off (RO-RO) ships, large strategic transport 
aircraft, unmanned platforms, and precision projection systems.   
 In the medium-term, the PLA will focus on developing the ability to project power to 
“countries and regions along the ‘Belt and Road’ and areas crucially related to key interests 
around the globe.” The focus of the PLA’s preparation for military struggle will be “fighting 
and winning an overseas informatized limited war or controlling a major crisis.” To this end, 
the PLA will develop unmanned projection systems on land, sea and air, with significant 
focus on precision air projection capabilities.  
 In the long-term, the PLA will primarily focus on “global projection.” It will rely on China’s 
overseas bases and air and space multi-dimensional projection systems to meet the rapid 
reaction requirements of transportation projection capabilities, in the event of a war anywhere 
around the globe. Future developments will include high-speed cargo rail, high-performance 
sea and air platforms, hypersonic transport aircraft, coordinated robotics and unmanned 
systems in automated transportation systems, and intelligent unmanned transport decision-
making systems.10    
To improve strategic projection capabilities, the PLA is constructing its own strategic lift forces, 
including heavy lift aircraft, military helicopters, large transport ships, amphibious ships, and 
replenishment ships.11 The PLA began developing its organic strategic lift capabilities relatively late 
compared to other great powers. Chinese military leaders believe the PLA has a long way to go 
before it can meet its strategic projection requirements.  
To support strategic projection, the PLA is also striving to enhance civil-military fusion in the 
nation’s maturing transportation infrastructure. The role of civilian carriers in strategic projection 
operations has become a major area of development in the military. In large part, this is driven by a 
desire to compensate for shortcomings in the PLA’s own organic lift capabilities. Civilian 
                                                          
8 肖天亮 [Xiao Tianliang], ed., 战略学 [The Science of Military Strategy], (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 
2015), pp. 195-200; Liu Jiasheng, “Development of Carriers for Strategic Projection in Response to National Security 
Needs,” p. 10. 
9 Liu Jiasheng, “Development of Carriers for Strategic Projection in Response to National Security Needs,” pp. 9-13. 
10 Ibid, pp. 9-13. 
11 米斌斌, 王圣立 [Mi Binbin, Wang Shengli], 现代战争优势战斗力的来源: 强大的空中战略投送能力 [“The Source 
of Superior Combat Effectiveness in Modern Warfare: Powerful Air Strategic Projection Capabilities”], 解放军报 [PLA 
Daily], June 12, 2016, www.81.cn/kj/2016-06/12/content_7095608.htm. 




transportation carriers organized for military transportation support are considered part of the PLA’s 
strategic projection support forces (战略投送支援力量).  
Organizing Civilian Carriers for Power Projection 
The PLA has the authority to assume control over civilian carriers for military purposes. This 
authority stems from a number of laws and regulations. These include the 1995 Regulation on 
National Defense Transportation, the 2003 Regulations on National Defense Mobilization of Civil 
Transport Resources, and the 2010 National Defense Mobilization Law.12 These laws underpinned 
the construction of National Defense Transportation Support Forces (国防交通保障队伍), which 
comprise civilian transportation reserve forces developed by government transportation management 
departments and industry to carry out a range of tasks for the PLA. Tasks include emergency repairs, 
construction, local facility support, and transportation support.13 Some of these forces have evolved 
to meet the new power projection requirements established by the PLA.  
In September 2016, China issued the National Defense Transportation Law, providing further clarity 
about the requirements of civil transportation resources in supporting the military’s missions. 
Superseding the 1995 Regulation on National Defense Transportation, it was designed to improve the 
PLA’s ability to leverage civilian carriers to support strategic projection. Among other things, the 
new law placed obligations on Chinese transportation enterprises located abroad or engaged in 
international shipping. It required them to provide logistical support for PLA forces operating 
overseas. The new law also introduced the concept of “strategic projection support forces.” Strategic 
projection support forces chiefly comprise large- and medium-sized Chinese companies organized 
into strategic projection support units. The 2016 Law charges them with responsibility for providing 
“rapid, long-distance, and large-scale national defense transportation support.”14  
Strategic projection support forces are managed directly by civil transportation enterprises under the 
guidance of national and provincial Transportation War Readiness Offices. The National 
                                                          
12 See chapter six in 国防交通条例 [Regulation on National Defense Transportation], 1995, 
https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E5%9B%BD%E9%98%B2%E4%BA%A4%E9%80%9A%E6%9D%A1%E4%BE%8B; 
Article two of 民用运力国防动员条例 [Regulations on National Defense Mobilization of Civil Transport Resources], 
2003, http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=f121bea40b0cb4a6bdfb&lib=law; Chapter ten of 国防动员法 [National 
Defense Mobilization Law], 2010, www.gov.cn/flfg/2010-02/26/content_1544415.htm.  
13 The national defense transportation support forces include “specialized support forces” (国防交通专业保障队伍) 
created in transportation enterprises and “transportation support forces along routes” created by local military districts and 
civilian governments. The strategic projection support forces originate out of enterprises from the specialized support 
forces. Chapter 5, Regulation on National Defense Transportation; 陈祥鹏, 海军, 孙振岚, 丁利亮 [Chen Xiangpeng, Hai 
Jun, Sun Zhenlan, Ding Liliang], 加强我国战略投送支援机队建设的思考 [“Consideration on Strengthening 
Construction of Strategic Delivery Support Fleet in New Period”], 军事交通学院学报 [Journal of Military 
Transportation University], no. 10 (2019), p. 11. 
14 Chapter five discusses the obligation of civilian entities in providing transportation support to the PLA, including its 
overseas missions. The strategic projection support forces explained in article 36 are likely distinct from general civilian 
entities that could be called up for support. These more organized forces have enhanced roles in power projection 
compared to previous civilian carriers that supported the PLA domestically. See articles 36-38, 《中华人民共和国国防交
通法》[Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defense Transportation], 中国人大网 [China National 
People’s Congress Online], September 3, 2016, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2016-09/03/content_1996764.htm; 
The 2016 National Defense Transportation Law also provides that during a war or crisis, the PRC would establish a 
National Defense Transportation Joint Command Organization (国防交通联合指挥机构) to command civil transportation 
resources. To date, there has been very little reporting on the circumstances of its activation or how it would function. See 
Article 13, National Defense Transportation Law of the People’s Republic of China. 




Transportation War Readiness Office (国家交通战备办公室) drafts guidelines, policies, and plans 
for mobilization of civil transportation resources in support of national defense.15 It also promulgates 
national defense mobilization standards. The National Transportation War Readiness Office is 
overseen by the Transport and Projection Bureau (运输投送局) of the CMC Logistic Support 
Department.16  
Provincial-level Transportation War Readiness Offices serve as the interface between the PLA and 
individual companies. They oversee implementation of national defense mobilization standards, 
ensure that civilian resources are available for the PLA when required, provide funding to national 
defense transportation mobilization work, and report on the availability of transportation resources to 
their relevant PLA counterparts.17 Military Representative Offices located in railway hubs, ports, and 
airports also help civil transportation enterprises meet national readiness requirements, which include 
periodic training exercises with PLA units.18  
Command and control of China’s strategic projection support forces remains unclear. PLA reforms 
established five Theater Commands out of the former seven Military Regions to enhance the PLA’s 
joint warfighting capabilities. Civilian carriers can be subject to the control of operational units 
within each Theater Command. However, the Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF), an independent 
force directly subordinate to the CMC also has command and control authorities over these civilian 
                                                          
15 Its responsibilities also include implementing national defense standards for construction of transportation infrastructure 
and resources, organizing and managing national defense transportation materials storage, as well as overseeing the 
construction of transportation support forces in the civilian economy.卢锐, 许四海 [Lu Rui, Xu Sihai], 军民融合加快推
进战略投送能力建设 - 国家交通战备办公室主任、中央军委后勤保障部运输投送局局长白忠斌答记者问 [“Civil-
Military Fusion Accelerates the Construction of Strategic Power Projection Capabilities - National Transportation 
Readiness Office Direct and Central Military Commission Logistic Support Department Transport and Projection Bureau 
Head Bai Zhongbin Answers Questions from Reporters”], 中国交通新闻网 [China Transportation News], September 6, 
2016, www.zgjtb.com/2016-09/06/content_94342.htm; 中国战争动员百科全书 [Chinese War Mobilization 
Encyclopedia], (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2003), p. 298. 
16 Run by a Corps Leader-grade officer, the CMC Transport and Projection Bureau is in charge of coordinating the PLA’s 
transportation over land, sea, and in the air. It replaced the former General Logistics Department’s Military Transportation 
Department. 原总后军交运输部副部长白忠斌任军委后勤保障部运输投送局长 [“Former Deputy Director of the 
Military General Logistics Department Transportation Department Bai Zhongbin Appointed Director of Central Military 
Commission Logistics Support Department Transport and Projection Department”], 澎拜新闻 [The Paper], September 5, 
2016, www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1524277 
17 Transportation War Readiness Offices fall under the National Defense Mobilization Commission system at the national 
and local levels, which prepare to mobilize national resources for national defense during peacetime and command the 
transition of those resources in service of the military during wartime. Chinese War Mobilization Encyclopedia, p. 298; 田
野, 张凯, 乔振友 [Tian Ye, Zhang Kai, Qiao Zhenyou],国防动员委员会三问明责: 我是谁、干什么、怎么干 
[“National Defense Mobilization Committee’s Three Questions on Duty: Who I am, What I do, and How to Implement”], 
解放军报 [PLA Daily], June 27, 2018, www.mod.gov.cn/mobilization/2018-06/27/content_4817763.htm; An often-
expressed phrase describing the guiding principle in how locally-coordinated transportation support forces and 
infrastructure are made available to the PLA is as follows: “the Military submits requirements, the Transportation War 
Readiness Office coordinates, and governments implement” (军队提需求、交通战备办公室搞协调、政府抓落实). 对
接交通基础设施建设军事需求 推进军民融合发展 [“Meeting Military Requirements in the Construction of 
Transportation Infrastructure”], 湖南省交通运输厅 [Hunan Province Department of Transportation], May 13, 2019, 
http://jtys.huaihua.gov.cn/26721/29261/content_702931.html . 
18 李宏, 高洁 [Li Hong, Gao Jie],战略投送支援船队开进联合演练场 [“Strategic Projection Support Ship Fleet Joins 
Joint Training”], 中国军网 [China Military Online], September 11, 2016, www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-
09/11/content_156271.htm  




forces. The JLSF supports the military services for all general logistics requirements, helping to 
relieve Theater Commands and the services of many duplicative support functions.19  
PLA Strategic Lift Developments 
Modern military operations are rapid and complex, and consume significant quantities of materials. 
In some scenarios, PLA power projection operations could require highly-coordinated, rapid, and 
precise mobilization of sea and air lift carriers to achieve large volumes of force.20 In such cases, it 
would be very difficult for the PLA to provide the entirety of its lift requirements organically.21 
Therefore, the PLA relies on civilian carriers as part of the strategic projection support forces to 
support its operations.  
Enterprises committing carriers to these forces are organized into three tiers (from largest to 
smallest): the zongdui (总队), dadui (大队), and zhongdui (中队).22 However, the exact composition 
and scale of these units at each tier is unclear. The following is an examination of China’s strategic 
projection support forces, with a focus on recent efforts to improve their ability to support PLA 
power projection operations.   
Strategic Sea Lift  
The PLAN has taken steps to modernize its strategic projection capabilities through construction of 
large amphibious platforms, fleet replenishment ships, and other fleet support vessels. Since 2008, 
the PLAN has received five Type-071 LPD and is building at least three more.23 The PLAN’s first 
Type-075 landing dock helicopter (LHD) launched in September 2019, inaugurating a new class of 
ships expected to significantly enhance the PLAN’s ability to conduct long-range power projection 
operations.24 Additionally, new fleet replenishment ships are under construction to sustain oceanic 
operations. The PLAN’s newest and largest Type-901 comprehensive replenishment ships displace 
                                                          
19 Transport and projection departments have been established in both the JLSF and Theater Commands, but their working 
relationship is unclear. The JLSF comprise the central Wuhan Base and subordinate centers in each of the Theater 
Commands. The former military transportation departments in the services have also been renamed similarly. 盈世勇, 刘
仁亮, 孙著 [Ying Shiyong, Liu Renliang, Sun Zhu], 改革开放 40年我军后勤改革的成就与启示 [“Achievements and 
Implications of PLA Logistics Reform in the Past 40 Years of Reform and Opening Up”], 中国军事科学 [China Military 
Science], no. 6 (2018), p. 56; 张方, 李剑肆, 何建涛 [Zhang Fang, Li Jiansi, He Jiantao], 加强空中战略投送地面保障体
系建设的思考 [“Thoughts on Accelerating Ground Security System Construction for Air Strategic Projection”], 军事交
通学院学报 [Journal of Military Transportation University], no. 4 (2017), p. 3. 
20 张健, 赵世宜 [Zhang Jian, Zhao Shiyi], 战略投送力量运用基本问题研究 [“Basic Issues on Employing Strategic 
Projection Force”], 军事交通学院学报 [Journal of Military Transportation University], no. 10 (2016), pp. 1-4. 
21  Shou Xiaosong, The Science of Military Strategy, p. 260. 
22 何国本, 邹伟, 鲍文华, 陈龙 [He Guoben, Zou Wei, Bao Wenhua, Chen Long], 战略投送支援船队训练现状及对策 
[“Current Situation and Countermeasures of Strategic Projection Support Fleet Training”], 军事交通学院学报 [Journal of 
Military Transportation University], no. 5 (May 2017), p. 2; Chen Xiangpeng, “Consideration on Strengthening 
Construction of Strategic Delivery Support Fleet in New Period,” p. 11. 
23 China’s first Type-071 LPD joined the South Sea Fleet in January 2008. 夏超波 [Xia Chaobo], 昆仑山舰 – ‘两栖先锋’ 
向深蓝 [“‘Amphibious Vanguard’ Kunlunshan to the Deep Blue”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], May 28, 2013, p. 4; 
Annual Report to Congress—Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019, Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, p. 37, https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-
1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf 
24 Xavier Vavasseur, “China Launches 1st Type 075 LHD for PLAN,” Naval News, September 25, 2019, 
www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2019/09/china-launches-1st-type-075-lhd-for-plan/; Minnie Chan, “China Building 
Navy’s Biggest Amphibious Assault Vessel, Sources Say,” South China Morning Post, March 29, 2017, 
www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2083109/china-building-navys-biggest-amphibious-assault-vessel. 




twice as much as the Type-903 Fuchi-class oilers and are designed to sustain future PLAN aircraft 
carrier formations and other fleet operations further abroad.25  
Despite these advancements, the PLAN’s organic lift capacity would likely prove inadequate in a 
number of scenarios. It is often recognized, for instance, that the PLAN lacks the amphibious lift 
required for an assault on Taiwan.26 Therefore, the PLAN would likely rely heavily on supporting 
fleets of civilian vessels to support power projection operations. 
To this end, in late 2012 the PLA began to create “strategic projection support ship fleets” (战略投送
支援船队), starting with vessels owned by China Shipping Group (中国海运集团).27 Built out of 
large Chinese marine enterprises, these fleets generally include RO-RO ships, container vessels, bulk 
carriers, tankers, auxiliary crane ships, barges, and semi-submersible ships.28 These vessels have 
been organized into numerous “transport dadui” (海运大队) for unit, fuel, and material transport.29 
According to PLA experts, these fleets “are responsible for force projection and logistics support in 
diversified military missions such as maritime combat operations, securing national maritime rights 
and interests, and the security of strategic passages.”30  
What follows is a detailed look at each of the different types of ships comprising the strategic 
projection support ship fleets. 
RO-RO Ships 
Large capacity RO-RO ships are ideal for rapidly transporting motorized and mechanized PLA units. 
PLA experts note that there are currently 63 civilian RO-RO ships suitable for use by military units, 
totaling 140,000 tons in capacity.31 Many of the companies operating RO-RO ships have been 
organized into transport units and are actively cooperating with the PLA. Many of their ships are 
capable of long-distance oceanic transport.  
                                                          
25 中国海军最大补给舰二号舰将入役 航母与其编队将获最强战力 [“The Second of Chinese Navy’s Largest 
Replenishment Ship to Enter Service—The Strongest Combat Power for Aircraft Carriers and their Formations”], 央视网 
[CCTV], February 21, 2019, http://military.cctv.com/2019/02/21/ARTIHtUyglsboSRcx8acPPOn190221.shtml; Viola 
Zhou, Sara Zheng, “China Commissions New Naval Supply Ship,” South China Morning Post, August 1, 2017, 
www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2105010/china-commissions-new-naval-supply-ship 
26 Kristin Huang, “Experts Doubt China’s Ability to Launch Assault on Taiwan,” South China Morning Post, May 12, 
2019, www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3009780/experts-doubt-chinas-ability-launch-assault-taiwan; Ben 
Werner, “Report: China Can’t Execute Major Amphibious Operations, Direct Assault on Taiwan,” US Naval Institute 
News, May 3, 2019, https://news.usni.org/2019/05/03/report-china-cant-execute-major-amphibious-operations-direct-
assault-on-taiwan. 
27 曹吴戈, 叶皓龙 [Cao Wuge, Ye Haolong], 民船参军 – 中国版远征船坞登陆舰浮出水面 [“Merchant Ships Join the 
Military—Chinese Version of Expeditionary Landing Ship Dock Emerges”], 广东交通 [Transportation of Guangdong], 
no. 4 (2017), p. 17. 
28 刘刚, 虞鹏程 [Liu Gang, Yu Pengcheng], 关于组建快速动员海运力量的思考 [“Our Reflection on the Quick 
Organization of Military Sealift Reserve Forces”], 国防交通工程与技术[Traffic Engineering and Technology for 
National Defence], no 3 (2014), p. 3.  
29 “Strategic Projection Support Ship Fleet Joins Joint Training.” 
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The Bohai Ferry Group (渤海轮渡股份有限公司) operates 11 RO-RO ferries in the Bohai Gulf, 
running quick routes from Yantai, Shandong province to Dalian, Liaoning province.32 Its ferries have 
been organized into the “Eighth Transport Dadui” (海运八大队) of the strategic projection support 
ship fleet.33 The company’s smaller ferries displace around 20,000 tons and have capacity for 200 
large and small vehicles and 1280 passengers with a minimal vertical clearance of 14 feet on the 
lower decks and 13 feet on the upper deck.34 The company also operates larger 35,000-ton ferries that 
can carry over 300 large and small vehicles and 2038 passengers. These can accommodate oversized 
special vehicles up to 120-tons and 26 feet wide with a vertical clearance of nearly 16 feet.35  
In spatial terms, these vessels could easily load the PLA’s Type-96 and Type-99 main battle tanks or 
infantry fighting vehicles such as the ZBL-09.36 However, according to a senior engineer at the 
former General Logistics Department, ships involved in the transport of forces require the installation 
of strengthened ramps and local deck structures.37 The strength of deck structures is a primary 
concern for RO-RO vessels embarking heavy military equipment. In principle, the heaviest 
equipment should be stowed in the bottom decks of these ships with lighter vehicles secured on 
upper decks. Loading procedures should secure equipment uniformly along vehicle lanes.38  
RO-RO ships inducted into the strategic projection support ship fleets indicate they already satisfy 
requirements for transporting PLA units. Recently-built ships designed with PLA oversight are more 
likely to meet requirements. When delivered in 2012, the Bohai Cuizhu (渤海翠珠号) was celebrated 
for implementing national defense requirements. The Jinan Military Region Military Transportation 
Department participated in its design. The Bohai Cuizhu is capable of delivering the heavy 
equipment and personnel of PLA units. It also features a helicopter pad, medical bay areas, and rapid 
                                                          
32 渤海轮渡集团公司简介 [“Bohai Ferry Group Company Introduction”], Bohai Ferry Group Website, 
www.bohailundu.cn/info/?id=1, (Accessed  August 20, 2019). 
33 李远星, 王丙 [Li Yuanxing, Wang Bing], 新时代战略投送支援力量建设运用研究 [“Research on Construction and 
Use of Strategic Projection Support Forces in the New Era”], 国防 [National Defense], no. 12 (2017), pp. 20-23. 
34 渤海金珠 [“Bohai Jinzhu”], Bohai Ferry Group Website, www.bohailundu.cn/ship/?type=list&classid=7, (Accessed 20 
August 2019). 
35 “渤海钻珠” [Bohai Zuanzhu], Bohai Ferry Group Website, http://www.bohailundu.cn/ship/?type=list&classid=20, 
(Accessed  August 20, 2019). 
36 中国 96式主战坦克 [“Chinese Type-96 Main Battle Tank”], 环球展望 [Global Outlook], January 8, 2006, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20090107115346/http://www.armsky.com/yuanchuangzhuangao/seechina/ChinaArmy/20060
1/3253.html; “Type 99A 99A2 ZTZ-99A MBT—Main Battle Tank China,” Army Recognition, December 23, 2018, 
www.armyrecognition.com/china_chinese_heavy_armoured_vehicle_tank_uk/type_99a_99_a2_ztz-
99a_main_battle_tank_china_11408171.html; 中国 ZBL-09 系列装甲车: 火力凶猛 借鉴西方设计 [“China ZBL-09 
Series of Armored Vehicles: Fierce Firepower—Design Borrowed from the West”], 新华网-参考消息 [Xinhua – 
Reference News], December 17, 2014, https://military.china.com/important/11132797/20141217/19117000_all.html . 
37 王和文 [Wang Hewen], 新形势下推动民船贯彻国防要求体系发展的思考 [“Thoughts on Promoting Development of 
Civilian Ship Carrying Out National Defense Requirements Under New Situation”], 军事交通学院学报 [Journal of 
Military Transportation], no. 11 (2015), p. 23. 
38 According to the PLA’s 2005 National Military Standard “Loading Standards for Armaments Maritime Transport in 
Main Ship Types” (GJB 5312-2004), lighter car decks generally can support average loads of 0.2–0.3 tons per square 
meter and heavy vehicle decks can support average loads of 2-3 tons per square meter. Loading plans must be carefully 
created to ensure ships remain seaworthy while also attempting to streamline debarkation procedures. See: 吴晓东, 苏鹏 
[Wu Xiaodong, Su Peng], 部队海上投送滚装船配积载模型与算法 [“Stowage Model and Algorithm of RO-RO Ships 
for Sea Projection”], 军事交通学院学报 [Journal of Military Transportation University], no. 4 (2016), p. 14; 陈益平 
[Chen Yiping], 军用车辆船舶滚装运输有关问题研究 [“Research into the RO-RO Transportation of Military Vehicles”], 
国防交通工程与技术 [Traffic Engineering and Technology for National Defence], no. 5 (2018), pp. 4-7.  




fastening systems. Prior to the Bohai Cuizhu’s maiden voyage, senior military officials observed an 
embarkation exercise with dozens of armored vehicles, artillery pieces, and transport trucks. The then 
head of the General Logistics Department Military Transportation Department declared the ship’s 
delivery a major advancement for the PLA’s strategic projection capabilities.39   
In southern China, vessels owned by the Hainan Strait Shipping Co. Ltd. (海南海峡航运股份有限公
司) run routes between ports in Guangdong and Guangxi to Hainan province. Its ferries have joined 
the “Ninth Transport Dadui.”40 While most of its RO-RO passenger ships are smaller in size, the 
company’s fleet displaces 165,633-tons and can carry 32,571 tons and 15,488 passengers in total.41 
The company also received an “Advance Unit” award during the National Transportation Industry 
Transportation War Readiness Work Conference held by the PLA in 2011.42  
Some Chinese RO-RO car carrier ships typically laden with Toyota, Geely, and other automotives 
are also integrated into the strategic projection support ship fleets. CSC RORO Logistics Co., LTD. 
(深圳长航滚装物流有限公司)—a subsidiary of China Merchants Group specializing in RO-RO 
vehicle shipping and logistics—is based out of Shenzhen and contains the “Fifth Transport Dadui.”43 
It operates a fleet of 25 car carriers and large transshipment depots around the country.44 Actively 
working with the PLA, this unit conducted eight transport missions in 2016. In March 2017, it 
conducted an “emergency maritime projection” exercise involving one of its ships, the Changdalong, 
a 20,000-ton car carrier built to national defense specifications. During the exercise, military 
containers with deployable field kitchens, toilets, and showers were emplaced on the top deck to 
improve habitability at sea. Military transportation departments regard this unit as a model example 
of implementing national defense standards in RO-RO ships.45 
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Image 1: A graphic depiction of the Changdalong in the February 2019 issue of Naval & Merchant Ships magazine. 
 
Image 2: A model of the Changdalong displayed at a 2017 exhibition in Beijing on the military’s achievements. 
Sources indicate it can transport two mechanized infantry battalions and has spaces and facilities for command and 
living quarters to support long-distance transport to the far seas. Tanks and various military vehicles are depicted 
on its decks and containers to supplement living conditions for troops on board are shown on the top deck.46 
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These fleets are not tied down to any single Theater Command. Strategic projection support ship 
fleets based in different parts of China—i.e., different “strategic directions”—can be mutually 
supporting. For example, the Bohai Ferry Group’s Eighth Transport Dadui could mobilize to support 
operations in the South China Sea, or the Hainan Strait Shipping Co. Ltd.’s Ninth Transport Dadui 
could dispatch its ferries to support operations in the Bohai area.47 
With access to a port facility, the RO-RO ships of these strategic projection transport dadui could 
rapidly disgorge large volumes of PLA motorized and mechanized ground forces. However, RO-RO 
ships are not just useful for ground combat maneuver units. The ships of the strategic projection 
support fleets are common user platforms available to the PLA joint forces. During the summer of 
2015, a 20,000-ton RO-RO vessel was used to transport the personnel and equipment of several 
PLAAF units in a “civil-military fusion trans-sea projection mission.” The PLAAF’s military 
transportation department, military representatives for navigational affairs, and company 
representatives carefully planned and gamed the exercise ahead of time, ensuring the successful 
execution of many detailed procedures such as securing equipment, data collection, vessel 
preparation, and transfer from motorized transport to vessel embarkation. This transport mission 
sought to establish new modes for transporting PLAAF units, which transited over 1,000 nautical 
miles from the Bohai Gulf to the South China Sea, disembarking at an unknown port in southern 
China.48  
The PLAAF conducted a similar exercise in November 2017, using a 15,000-ton RO-RO vessel to 
transport aviation, ground-to-air missile, radar, and electronic countermeasures forces from the South 
China Sea to the Bohai Gulf. It repeated the exercise in 2019. Such exercises reportedly ensure 
power projection through the transport of entire combat systems rather than just personnel and their 
equipment. Chinese experts also claim these exercises aid in transforming power projection 
operations from coastal and offshore areas into the far seas.49 The movement of whole PLAAF units 
could be required for future missions far from the mainland, such as operations out of major airfields 
constructed on artificial islands in the South China Sea or to future overseas airbases. Since 2016, the 
PLAAF has conducted training on distant islands and reefs by moving its units on such RO-RO 
ships. PLAAF logistics experts have specifically mentioned the increasing requirement to be capable 
of moving its units to Chinese-built “battlefield facilities” in the Spratlys via maritime transport.50 
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Image 3: PLAAF units load onto a RO-RO vessel of the strategic projection support ship fleet.51   
These ships are also used to deliver ammunition to military units. Under direction of the Northern 
Theater Command, vehicles loaded with troops and various types of ammunition embarked aboard 
one of COSCO Shipping Group’s RO-RO ships in September 2016 for transport to an island firing 
range. This was reportedly the first time the Northern Theater Command used civilian ships to 
transport ammunition.52    
Container Ships 
While RO-RO ships are ideal for transporting unit equipment, container ships can more efficiently 
move the PLA’s cargo.53 Containerized shipping brings advantages in speed and regularity that is 
often lacking in other forms of shipping.54 Shipping juggernaut China COSCO Shipping Corporation 
Limited alone operates 497 container ships that can move over three million twenty-foot equivalent 
units, making it the third largest container carrier in the world.55 It stands to reason that the PLA 
would leverage China’s vast fleet of large container shipping. 
There are numerous considerations in the PLA’s use of containers, such as types of containers, 
suitability of equipment to fit in containers, loading practices, and the ability of units to receive 
equipment through containerized transport. For example, semi-knockdown loading, where equipment 
is partially disassembled for loading into containers, can improve efficiency. However, deployed 
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units lacking home-based technical capabilities may burn significant time attempting to restore 
equipment to operating status if reassembly is difficult.56 This is particularly critical for moving large 
and heavy military equipment via containerized transport. China’s container shipping companies 
have significant experience in semi-knockdown loading and the use of specialized containers.57  
Additionally, PLA experts also advocate for working with civilian industry to develop container 
technology for use by the military. Delivery of such specialized containers strengthened and 
modified for oversized and heavy military equipment will not likely be an issue, as China 
International Marine Container Group has long been the world’s largest manufacturer of shipping 
containers.58 The PLA is also working on information systems that enable tracking of containers and 
their contents to ensure required materials are delivered where they are needed. As PLA experts have 
observed, problems with container tracking impacted US operations during the 1991 Gulf War.59      
The PLA is actively developing its ability to use civilian container ships. Companies like Shanghai 
Changjiang Shipping Co., Ltd. (上海长江轮船有限公司), owned by logistics giant Sinotrans & 
CSC, are now providing containerized shipping services as part of the strategic projection support 
ship fleet. In November 2018, this company participated in exercises under the direction of the 
Eastern Theater Command’s Transport and Projection Bureau’s Dispatch Center.60  
The PLAN’s Naval Research Institute has developed container ship modifications enabling alongside 
dry cargo replenishment, testing a modular electrically-powered tensioner system installed on the 
foredeck of another Sinotrans & CSC container vessel in November 2019. During at sea tests, the 
container ship Fuzhou transferred containers to the Type 054A frigate Linyi and the Type 903 
replenishment ship Dongpinghu. A first for the PLAN, this test could represent a new path for 
maritime prepositioning support.61 
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Image 4: Sinotrans & CSC container vessel Fuzhou conducts dry cargo alongside replenishment tests with the Linyi 
in November 2019. 
Tanker Vessels 
The limited number of PLAN fleet support ships capable of efficient underway replenishment would 
likely be working at maximum capacity during any large-scale PLA projection of power at sea. 
Petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) provisioning by strategic projection support ship fleets will prove 
essential to meet the PLAN’s bunkering requirements when fleet support ships become unavailable.  
Civilian tanker vessels are being built and organized for longer-range power projection support and 
are being integrated into the strategic projection support ship fleets. After signing agreements with 
the local Transportation War Readiness Office and the Ningbo port’s Military Representative Office 
for Navigational Affairs in 2014, the Ningbo East Sea Shipping Co., Ltd. (宁波东海海运有限公司) 
began constructing tanker ships that implemented national defense standards. After the delivery of 
the East Sea-221, an 11,000-ton tanker, in August 2015, the company established a “Transport 
Dadui” (海运大队).62        
Some reports on one of the new tankers built to national defense standards indicate faster speeds, 
military communications capabilities, the ability to conduct astern fueling for naval ships and special 
coatings allowing tankers to transport diesel and aviation fuels.63 These improvements come at a 
cost. As the chairman of the Zhejiang Ruiyuan Shipping Company (浙江瑞远海运有限公司)—
which operates tankers as part of the strategic projection support ship fleet—explained in 2015, these 
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standards increased the cost of construction by 10-15 percent and extended maintenance periods.64 
One of the company’s tankers, the Ruiyuan-5, conducted refueling training for PLAN ships in 
September 2016.65 
Some tankers are capable of both astern and alongside underway replenishment. This capability was 
demonstrated in October 2014 when a China Shipping Group (中国海运集团) tanker Huachuan 
refueled the East Sea Fleet’s Putian guided missile frigate (523) in the East China Sea.66 The exercise 
was hailed as a major breakthrough in the use of strategic projection support forces for replenishment 
at sea.  
 
Image 5: China Shipping Group tanker Huachuan refuels the Putian in the East China Sea on 25 October 2014. 
Semi-submersible Ships 
The PLA is currently developing sea-based logistics capabilities for use in scenarios when it lacks 
access to piers, such as during amphibious operations. Additionally, the PLA requires sea-based 
logistics capabilities to compensate for its lack of overseas bases and inability to conduct loading and 
transfer operations without pier access.67 According to the PLA Daily, future amphibious operations 
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will regard the ocean as a basic maneuvering area for landing operations and will establish “floating 
bases at sea” that integrate command and control, logistics, and fire support.68 
Acting as mobile seabases, semi-submersible ships enable the transfer of forces and equipment 
between platforms or to connectors at offshore assembly areas. These highly versatile ships can serve 
numerous supporting functions across the range of military operations requiring lift and working 
platforms at sea for the PLA. For example, PLA reports highlight their value protecting overseas 
interests through enhanced logistics capacity and speed to deliver heavy equipment and combat 
materials to front-line units.69  
The PLAN received its first and currently its only semi-submersible ship the Donghaidao in July 
2015.70 It was used to transport equipment and materials to China’s first overseas base in Djibouti in 
August 2017.71 The PLA is also developing the capability to use civilian semi-submersible ships in 
ways akin to US Navy expeditionary transfer docks.72  
China’s first large self-propelled semi-submersible was the Tai’an Kou, launched by Guangzhou 
Shipyard International Company Ltd. in 2001 for COSCO Shipping.73 More advanced semi-
submersible ships displacing greater tonnages have been built in subsequent years. Most are operated 
by Chinese companies.  
China’s presence in this market is substantial. Of the 34 large, open-deck semi-submersible ships 
built within the last 25 years, 27 are operated by Chinese companies.74 COSCO Shipping Specialized 
Carriers Co. Ltd. operates eight vessels. Launched in 2016, the largest is capable of carrying 98,000 
metric tons.75  
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Another company, Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries Company Ltd., has seven vessels with lift 
capacity ranging from over 30,000 to 50,000 tons.76 Its latest semi-submersible ship, the Zhenhua-33, 
is China’s first “civil-military dual-use semi-submersible ship.” Launched from Nantong City in June 
2016 and fully implementing national defense standards, it is meant to serve “intermediate support 
functions” (海上中继保障功能) for the PLA. Intermediate support functions, according to one 
expert, will require helicopter support systems on-board, such as munitions storage compartments, 
and connections and hoses for fueling containers. With these capabilities installed aboard the 
Zhenhua-33, helicopters can have additional re-arming and fueling platforms at sea.77 Overseen by 
the Wuxi Joint Logistics Support Center, this ship can also provide berthing for transfer operations 
and emergency ship repair and retrieval.78 PLA experts state that vessels like the Zhenhua-33 can 
“multiply the ability of the PLA Navy Marine Corps to deploy across the seas.”79 
Chinese semi-submersible ships have taken part in numerous logistics support exercises, serving as 
transfer platforms between the PLA’s landing ships and civilian cargo vessels. Additionally, they can 
deliver mobile loading equipment, floating barges, and landing stages needed to build mobile ports at 
sea, thereby creating “sea to shore mobile comprehensive debarking systems” (海岸机动综合卸载系
统). The Wuxi Joint Logistics Support Center is adding semi-submersible vessels to the strategic 
projection support ship fleets to support power projection and amphibious operations.80  
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Image 6: The Zhenhua-33 in Qidong, Nantong City.81 
Strategic Air Lift 
Strategic air lift is an increasingly critical component of PLA power projection. In a conflict scenario, 
strategic air lift can grant the PLA a relative advantage by rapidly concentrating forces in decisive 
locations to achieve psychological shock, strategic or operational surprise, and destructive effects 
that can render paralysis in adversaries.82 Strategic airlift is also vital for a whole range of non-
combat operations.  
The PLA currently relies on a limited fleet of Y-20 and IL-76 heavy transport aircraft for its primary 
strategic air lift carriers, as well as a number of Y-8 and Y-9 medium aircraft for tactical lift.83 The 
PLA acknowledges the inadequacy of these forces.84 The PLA’s air rescue effort during the 2008 
earthquake disaster in Sichuan, for example, highlighted severe shortcomings in its strategic air lift 
and ground support.85 Due to the urgent demand for such capabilities and the shortage of organic air 
                                                          
81 Ibid. 
82 Mi Binbin, “The Source of Superior Combat Effectiveness in Modern Warfare: Powerful Air Strategic Projection 
Capabilities.”  
83 The PLAAF is tasked with building strategic air lift to be made available to all PLA services. See: Zhang Fang, 
“Thoughts on Accelerating Ground Security System Construction for Air Strategic Projection,” p. 3; 运-9到底有多厉害? 
这些机型都是由它 “变形” [“How Powerful is the Yun-9? These Aircraft Types Have All ‘Morphed’ from It”], 央视网 
[CCTV], November 24, 2018, http://news.cctv.com/2018/11/24/ARTIPC0zeumXkIhGFoWUTsZS181124.shtml; Cristina 
L. Garafola, Timothy R. Heath, “The Chinese Air Force’s First Steps Toward Becoming an Expeditionary Air Force,” 
RAND Corporation, 2017, pp. 7-8. 
84 张昕, 苑德春, 张超 [Zhang Xin, Yuan Dechun, Zhang Chao], 依托战略投送支援机队实施海外航空战略投送 
[“Overseas Aviation Strategic Projection Using Strategic Projection Support Fleet”], 军事交通学院 [Journal of Military 
Transportation University], no. 4 (2018), p. 6. 
85 A number of aircraft were unable to unload and others were sitting on standby at other airports, such as Chengdu 
Shuangliu International Airport and Taipingshi Airport. See Zhang Fang, “Thoughts on Accelerating Ground Security 
System Construction for Air Strategic Projection,” p. 3; 仁宣 [Ren Xuan], 解放军空运能力严重缺乏无法应对真正的战




lift, civil aviation fleets serve as a necessary and crucial means for filling the gaps and ensuring 
effective PLA power projection operations. 
PLAAF officers involved in this work recognize the importance of the role of civilian carriers in 
supplementing PLA strategic air lift. As director of the PLAAF Logistics Department Transport and 
Projection Bureau (局长) Zhang Fang wrote in 2017, “Accelerating the generation of combat power 
for rapid response, emergency maneuver, all-domain maneuver, and cross-border maneuver of forces 
and firepower in future wars is increasingly inseparable from aviation strategic projection and the 
support of its robust ground support system. Military air transport formations and civil aviation 
reserve forces must be comprehensively used.”86 A division director (处长) within the same 
department further reinforced this point in early 2019, stating “the strategic air projection force 
system is currently stepping up construction primarily with the military’s air transport forces 
supplemented by civilian aviation transport forces.”87  
The potential lift in China’s civilian aviation industry is significant. According to PLA experts, the 
total registered aircraft in 2017 numbered 3,160 passenger aircraft with over 500,000 seats. Civilian 
cargo aircraft were far fewer at 143 medium and large aircraft. The vast majority of China’s aviation 
fleet is comprised of Boeing and Airbus passenger aircraft with domestically-produced aircraft 
accounting for only 1.6 percent. Civilian cargo aircraft are largely Boeing aircraft. According to 
Chinese experts, the development and introduction of China’s first domestically-developed passenger 
aircraft, the C919, will help optimize the industry.88  
Since the 18th Party Congress, the CMC has ordered expanded roles for civil aviation in preparing 
aviation transportation and projection for military conflict.89 The first “strategic projection air support 
fleet” (战略投送支援机队) was established in 2013 with China Southern Airlines. Since then, 15 
more have been selected and created from large commercial aviation companies, including fleets in 
Air China and China Eastern Airlines. As civil aviation reserve forces whose employees are 
unarmed, these fleets primarily conduct missions such as transporting troops, evacuating casualties or 
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sick personnel, and rapidly delivering materials and equipment.90 Recent efforts have included 
increasing service to remote areas to satisfy requirements for high-elevation and island transport and 
projection.91  
 
Image 7: This released photo shows troops embarking aboard a China Southern Airlines aircraft during a PLAN 
Marine Corps-wide trans-regional long-range projection training exercise held in March 2018.92 
Like their shipping counterparts, the strategic projection support aircraft fleets form “strategic air 
transport dadui” (战略空运大队) and subordinate zhongdui. As an example, the Chongqing 
Zhongdui is subordinate to the “Southwest Plateau Emergency Aviation Transport Dadui” (西南高原
应急航空输送大队). Set up in 2014, the Chongqing Zhongdui comprises facilities, aircraft, and 
ground support resources from several entities, including the company operating Chongqing Jiangbei 
International Airport, the Chongqing air traffic control branch, and several civilian aviation and 
aviation support companies.93 The zhongdui is divided into eight function-based groups: airport 
support, air traffic control, aviation fuel support, flight, passenger cabin [support], ground service, 
aircraft maintenance, and loading/unloading support. This zhongdui reportedly has 16 aircraft 
(Airbus 319 and Boeing 737) that provide service to high-elevation airports.94 In the months 
preceding this zhongdui’s establishment, PLA representatives in the Chongqing area were busy 
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coordinating civilian aviation support for Chinese U.N. Peacekeeping units combating the Ebola 
outbreak in West Africa. Experience gained from this operation may have provided proof of the 
benefits of more organized civil aviation support.  
China’s civilian air cargo carriers support the PLA in other ways. They use mature, established 
logistics networks, fleets of cargo aircraft, and information systems to monitor and manage cargo 
flows during the course of their regular operations. The growth of commercial air delivery services 
stems from significant demand by Chinese consumers and the rise of internet shopping. Cargo 
delivery companies working with the PLA can offer proven logistic services for the movement and 
tracking of military materials.   
In October 2017, the PLAAF’s logistics support department signed strategic cooperation agreements 
with major logistics companies, including SF Express, China Post Express, Deppon Logistics, and 
Jingdong Logistics.95 Companies like SF Express, a major air courier in China, operates a fleet of 54 
cargo freighters largely comprising Boeing aircraft. While signing agreements with SF Express, the 
head of PLAAF logistics stated that future cooperation will focus on supporting warfighting through 
new methods of logistics support.96 The PLA sees this large network of civilian cargo aircraft and 
facilities nationwide as a key capability to integrate into the strategic projection support aircraft 
fleets.97 
Other cargo couriers such as China Postal Airlines have long conducted missions for the PLA. China 
Postal Airlines has supported the PLA since it was established in 1996, conducting air transport 
missions in disaster relief and medical support. With its fleet of 33 Boeing freighter aircraft flown by 
host of former PLA pilots, this airline established a “strategic support cargo dadui” (战略支援货运
大队) and the “19th Strategic Air Transport Dadui” (战略空运十九大队) in 2015.98 The 19th 
Strategic Air Transport Dadui conducted its first combat readiness embarkation exercise at Nanjing 
Lukou International Airport in September 2017, reviewing support planning and procedures while 
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military representatives, aviation officials, and numerous other civilian airline company personnel 
observed.99  
Naturally, the use of civilian air transport resources has limited utility in areas that see active combat. 
Any armed threats to civilian transport companies would present significant risk. These fleets are 
therefore primarily used to complete low-threat missions in peacekeeping operations, foreign 
assistance, military training, and non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO).  
Some aspects of the PLA’s first overseas NEO from Libya in 2011 illustrated the value of civil air 
transport prior to the creation of strategic projection support aircraft fleets. Four PLAAF IL-76 
aircraft from the Guangzhou Military Region and one Type-054A frigate from the PLAN’s 7th Escort 
Task Force in the Gulf of Aden were sent to assist the NEO. Over 35,000 Chinese citizens in Libya 
were evacuated to Tunisia via ground transport, merchant ship, and civilian aircraft, including 91 
Chinese and 35 foreign chartered flights.100 In situations where ground support, fuel, and security are 
limited, the PLA can provide its transports as a link to civilian airliners. In 2011, the four IL-76s 
deployed to assist in the evacuation of 5,600 Chinese citizens waiting at Sabha airport in 
southwestern Libya helped provide this link.101 They ferried 1,655 personnel from Sabha to 
Khartoum International Airport, Sudan, where evacuees could then board Chinese civilian airlines.102 
The heavy reliance on civilian carriers in Libya likely convinced Chinese leaders of the value of 
being able to leverage civil aircraft for longer-range missions. 
Going forward, strategic projection support aircraft fleets will likely see more use in overseas NEOs. 
They are particularly useful for evacuating Chinese citizens from areas experiencing natural 
disasters. During the November 2017 Mount Agung volcanic eruption in Bali, Indonesia, aircraft of 
the strategic projection support aircraft fleet reportedly evacuated 17,000 Chinese nationals out of 
Ngurah Rai International Airport.103  
For regions experiencing war and instability, these fleets can transport personnel and cargo from the 
rear to the margins of the combat zone, where they can then complete onward movement using 
organic military carriers, such as PLA aircraft.104  
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Rail & Road Strategic Projection 
Despite not being the focus of this report, surface transport is vital to the success of power projection 
over water. Rail and road transport brings PLA forces and material from China’s vast interior to 
frontier and distant areas. In recent years, the PLA has made improvements in its ability to leverage 
civilian surface carriers in support of its power projection capabilities. 
Nationally, rail transport occupies a “core” position in the PLA’s strategic projection capabilities. 
Movement by rail grants large capacities, low costs, and resilience against inclement weather, 
making it a solid resource for getting PLA forces across theater commands.105 The near-national 
coverage of China’s rail system and innovations in moving lighter units via high-speed rail are 
enabling rapid strategic projection operations anywhere within China’s borders.106 At regular rail 
speed, the PLA is able to move personnel and equipment together less than 1,000 km a day. 
However, using high-speed rail a light division can be moved approximately 3,500 km in a 24 hour 
period. The Eastern Theater Command reported in late 2018 that the Fuxing Hao high-speed rail 
lines are regularly transporting light units.107  
If military personnel, equipment, and materials could be moved on dedicated high-speed rail cars, it 
would significantly enhance PLA power projection operations throughout the country and region.108 
However, PLA forces in large part have not been able to effectively utilize the high-speed rail 
network since it is primarily designed for light passenger transportation. High-speed rail may lack 
sufficient power to transport some forces on certain lines with high inclines. Furthermore, the design 
of bridges and stations may not be suitable for PLA forces.109 This could impact the movement of 
forces to hubs and points of embarkation, therefore constraining PLA combat force generation when 
urgently required. Nevertheless, PLA engineers and researchers are working to expand the role of the 
high-speed rail network in strategic projection operations.110  
Another crucial element in unit transport via rail is the ability to conduct emergency mobile loading 
in the field, when railway infrastructure may be degraded due to enemy strikes. According to PLA 
experts, the military transportation departments of the theater commands, the PLAN, PLAAF, and 
PLA Rocket Force have been equipped with mobile railway platforms. These have seen widespread 
use in railway projection missions and exercises. Light platforms, vehicle mounted platforms, and 
mechanized railway platforms for heavy equipment have been distributed to various units. Such 
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platforms are also useful when fixed platform space is limited.111 The vehicle-mounted railway field 
platform was on display in the October 2019 PLA Military Parade.112  
These developments in rail transport provide important connections for the movement of equipment 
and materials in large volumes to major ports of embarkation. But China has also developed the 
ability to transport the trains themselves over water. Completed in 2003, the Guangdong-Hainan 
Railway (粤海铁路) was China’s first cross-sea railway. It runs from Zhanjiang, Guangdong, home 
to the Southern Theater Command Navy headquarters, down to Hai’an Township at the tip of the 
Leizhou Peninsula, where lengths of rail cars are loaded aboard ferries and transported to Haikou, 
Hainan province.113 With the completed upgrades to the Hainan Western Ring Railway in 2007, 
freight trains arriving from Guangdong can continue on from Haikou down to the southern city of 
Sanya, home to the Yulin Naval Base.114 Using imported German anti-rolling technology, these 
ferries are capable of operating in extreme sea states: there are reportedly only around 30 days per 
year where weather conditions in the Qiongzhou Strait do not permit transit.115  
This system has important implications for Chinese power projection into the South China Sea.116 In 
November 2017, the Guangdong-Hainan Railway began offering transport services using flatbed cars 
for oversized military equipment. Compared to transferring equipment onto ships, this practice 
shortened transit times by nearly 10 hours and allows equipment to be moved directly from 
Guangdong to Phoenix International Airport or Sanya Station, near Yulin Naval Base.117  
In the north, Yantai, Shandong province and Dalian, Liaoning province have similar rail-ferry-rail 
connections that can support freight movement across the Bohai Gulf.118 This could support mobility 
across the Bohai Gulf and alleviate rail congestion in the projection of power into North Korea and 
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other parts of Northeast Asia. The Bohai Ferry Group (discussed above) has conducted transport 
exercises for the PLA. In August 2016, it embarked rail cars loaded with a PLAAF brigade’s 
containerized generators, tractors, and mobile kitchens at West Lüshun Station, and delivered them to 
Yantai port, Shandong province. Military use of the rail-ferry-rail connection between the Shandong 
Peninsula and the Liaoning Peninsula was established in accordance with the joint operational 
requirements of the Northern Theater Command, and has reportedly reduced transit time into the 
northeast by 30 hours.119  
In July 2019, a PLAN Marine Corps (PLANMC) combined arms unit utilized nine ferries, including 
those from the Eighth Transport Dadui and rail-car ferries operated by China Railway Bohai Railway 
Ferry, to transit armor, artillery, support vehicles and personnel across the Bohai Gulf to Dalian. 
Among the reported advantages of this approach was improved operational security: keeping military 
units at sea reduced the attention drawn to unit movements by road closures.120 
 
Image 8: PLANMC units transported by railway ferries in July 2019.  
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Image 9: RO-RO vessels embark PLANMC vehicles in July 2019.121 
 
 
Image 10: A vehicle-mounted railway field platform used during the “Firepower-2015” trans-regional exercise.122 
Bridging the Bohai Gulf and Qiongzhou Strait with PLA rail transport connections provides 
important opportunities for PLA training and projection operations. One senior engineer from the 
CMC Logistics Department explained in 2016 that demand for unit training in maritime projection 
will increase in the future. He stated that “the trial operations of cross-sea railway ferry transports for 
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units has opened up a new strategic transport passage, innovated modes of joint projection, and 
improved the efficiency of projection support.”123 
Strategic projection support forces also include truck fleets (战略投送支援车队). These serve as 
excellent connectors between other modes of transportation and have the flexibility to access areas 
unavailable to rail, shipping, or air transport. The first of these trucking fleets was established by the 
former Xinjiang Military Region in July 2013 out of a transportation enterprise associated with the 
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. According to PLA reports, this fleet includes zhongdui 
for container, bulk cargo, and oil transport respectively, and contains dedicated emergency 
command, communications, refueling and maintenance trucks. Under contract with the former 
Xinjiang Military Region (now Western Theater Command), this truck fleet is obligated to rapidly 
activate emergency plans and carry out transport missions once orders are received.124     
Trucking fleets are already seeing use in PLA exercises. In an August 2017 exercise, the strategic 
projection support truck fleet in one of China National Petroleum Corporation’s aviation fuel 
transport subsidiaries helped supplement the PLAAF’s refueling requirements. A first for the newly 
created JLSF, the transport and projection office of the Guilin Joint Logistics Support Center 
mobilized 20 of the company’s trucks to transport aviation fuel 300-km after its own fuel trucks 
proved insufficient.125  
While trucking may appear to lie on the lower-end of the projection spectrum, it has proven to be a 
bottleneck in power projection capabilities for the PLA. The movement of armored units is 
constrained by a lack of flat-bed trucks for moving tracked vehicles, and low numbers of tractor 
trailers and tanker trucks.126 As one PLA officer notes, the US military currently employs a ratio of 
one transport vehicle for every seven units of heavy equipment, which can be augmented to one 
vehicle for every three units of equipment during war time. China however, is far behind in its 
trucking resources. Nationally, civilian trucking fleets can only generate several hundred trucks 
suited to transporting tanks and armored vehicles, as heavy trucking has been limited in tonnage 
capacity due to industry regulation. For example, there are only around one-hundred 40-ton or 
greater low-flatbed trucks dispersed nationwide, and they are difficult to mobilize. The width of 
civilian trucks are also an important consideration. PLA experts recommend modifying low flatbed 
semi-trucks by widening their beds to more than three meters, thereby enabling the transport of 
tracked vehicles.127  
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Strategic Projection Bases 
In order to respond to new strategic projection requirements, the PLA is also transforming the way it 
develops its bases and uses transportation infrastructure. It has sought to better integrate PLA 
logistics forces and civilian transportation resources, and it has built specialized facilities and bases 
to help it do so.  
The PLA established its first “civil-military fusion strategic projection base” (军民融合战略投送基
地) in 2014.128 It is located in Zhengzhou, Henan province, the location of the JLSF Zhengzhou Joint 
Logistic Support Center assigned to the Central Theater Command. Zhengzhou is a major road, rail, 
and aviation hub. The Zhengzhou Strategic Projection Base is developing network integration 
between rail and road services with airports for rapid troop, equipment, and materials loading onto 
aircraft.129 It is a test base for improving joint logistics support for strategic projection capabilities 
that will “cover the nation and radiate overseas” (覆盖全国、辐射境外). According to base staff, the 
Zhengzhou base marks a key step in conducting “long-range rapid multi-dimensional projection of 
large quantities of forces” and is gradually developing capabilities for all-domain support and distant 
deployment to conduct overseas projection support missions.130 
The projection base is adjacent to the Zhengzhou Xinzheng International Airport, where a “base 
command position” was created in conjunction with the airport operational command center.131 The 
base is also reportedly frequented by PLA academies for training and research on advanced joint 
logistics support.132 From 26-28 December 2016, the National Transportation War Readiness Office 
held a training course in Zhengzhou to familiarize officials in various sectors on the recently 
promulgated National Defense Transportation Law. Reporters at this event were allowed to visit the 
base where they noted “materials delivery teams working quickly and orderly to transship and load 
materials, a three-dimensional automated warehouse for aviation containers rapidly operating, and a 
support mode that fuses mechanization and informatization in integrated materials transport 
processes, pre-storage, and transshipment.”133 If automation and technical standards that can 
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streamline logistics processes are successfully implemented at the Zhengzhou base, they will likely 
be adopted on a larger scale at similar facilities elsewhere in the future.   
To date, the Zhengzhou Strategic Projection Base has supported Theater Command-level trans-
regional exercises and provided a staging base for air lift in support of rotating peacekeeping forces 
and trans-regional special police missions. It has also supported China’s aid missions in Myanmar 
and Afghanistan with materials transportation.134  
Integrated with PLA rear depots, bases like the one in Zhengzhou will preposition forces and 
materials and aid their movement from the heartland to a strategic direction, or help them to rapidly 
respond to national emergencies.135 They enable the unified integration of projection support 
resources, often covering a wide geographic area. They also work to optimize these resources with 
new facilities and equipment so they can take on diverse missions and deal with larger volumes of 
forces and materials. When force projection orders are given, operational units can rely on these 
bases to provide a host of dual-use carriers and solutions for sustainment, rest, staging, technical 
preparation, transshipment, materials distribution, casualty retrieval, and training. As long as a unit 
can reach one of these bases, its mobility will be greatly enhanced.136  
Challenges in Effective Strategic Projection 
The PLA has clearly made major progress developing its strategic projection support forces. 
However, Chinese military experts are acutely aware of ongoing challenges preventing the military 
from fully leveraging civilian carriers for power projection purposes. These chiefly include problems 
with national defense standards, inadequate training, weak operational security, and inadequacies 
within the PLA itself. 
Standards  
To effectively support PLA power projection, civilian carriers must fully implement national defense 
standards. Approved in 2015, the Technical Standards for New Civilian Ships to Implement National 
Defense Requirements provided significant guidance and support for China’s growing merchant fleet 
to ensure its readiness for military service.137 However, large numbers of vessels not conforming to 
these standards have already been built. These older vessels will require significant modification and 
conversion before they can conduct missions for the military. As the deputy commander of the 
Northern Theater Command Army explained in March 2017, out of the 200,000 transport vessels in 
China, fewer than 2000 are suited for “direct mobilization.”138 
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National defense standards in the aviation industry are also inadequate. Several technical and general 
standards have been reviewed and approved by the PLA. These include General Technical 
Requirements for Air Transportation and Facilities Construction Standards for Conversion of 
Permanent Airfields into Bases. The PLAAF has also implemented the Code of Practice for Resident 
Loading and Unloading Detachments for Air Transport (Trial) to further improve standards in 
ground support teams.139 However, some standards are clearly outdated, or based on Russian or 
American standards. Others face difficulties with operationalization. For example, some vehicles 
cannot be loaded onto aircraft due to unforeseen size constraints or poor packing methods. More 
efficient methods of moving materials—such as containerized shipping equipment for air transport—
are gradually being implemented.140 
Training 
Civilian carriers and their crews require training to maintain readiness levels in the fleets and ensure 
they can meet PLA requirements. The National Transportation War Readiness Office promulgated 
the first Outline for Training and Evaluation of National Defense Transportation Specialized Support 
Forces in early 2015. Strategic projection support forces were then subject to a new set of training 
requirements meant to guide and standardize training.141 Monitored by local transportation war 
readiness offices, training responsibilities are divided differently at the zongdui, dadui, and zhongdui 
levels. Zongdui are expected to formulate annual training plans for the dadui-level units, focusing on 
formation maneuvers, command, communication, and lifesaving training with PLAN ships. Dadui 
organize and implement these plans, combining their regular transportation work with support for 
major exercises by PLA units. Such training is conducted once or twice a year. Zhongdui-level units 
execute training plans by dispatching personnel and allocating equipment and materials to take part 
in training activities. They also conduct self-evaluations.142 
However, a 2017 study by PLA experts found that in many cases enterprise management staff were 
not enthusiastic about spending money, resources, and time on peacetime training. In fact, many 
enterprises had not even established departments for handling training matters and dedicated no 
personnel to overseeing training plan development and requirements. Since training is primarily 
conducted by the enterprises themselves, their negligent approach to training has meant a lack of 
combat realism. Compounding this issue is the reported limited ability of transportation war 
readiness offices to oversee and assist the organization of fleet training.143  
Operational Security 
Article 9 of the National Defense Transportation Law states that any organization or individual has a 
duty of confidentiality for state and commercial secrets learned during national defense 
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transportation work.144 However, this does not always happen. For example, some personnel in the 
strategic projection support aircraft fleet purportedly lack awareness in security and secrecy.145 In a 
conflict or crisis, poor operational security by China’s civilian carriers could enable the adversary to 
more easily track PLA movements.  
The PLA is taking steps to remedy this problem. Civilian trucking fleets are reportedly committed to 
secrecy as part of confidentiality clauses in the contracts they sign with the PLA. They also receive 
dedicated computers and classified materials handling and “secrecy” training.146 In the future, 
merchant shipping training could include silent running operations and encryption training to ensure 
the PLA can engage in encrypted communications with ship formations during wartime.147  
Problems with the PLA  
Some problems are not the fault of civilian carriers themselves. Rather, they relate to weaknesses 
within the PLA and its ability to integrate civilian carriers into joint operations. Since 2015, the PLA 
has undergone major organizational reforms. One objective is to improve jointness. This process is 
far from complete, and has created organizational uncertainties for China’s strategic projection 
support forces.  
Greater use of civilian carriers could enhance logistics support for joint operations. However, poor 
coordination between the services can inhibit their effective use. For example, PLAAF experts argue 
that greater use of strategic projection support forces, like civilian sea and air carriers, can rectify the 
significant shortfalls in PLA organic projection capabilities out to places like the Spratlys. However, 
they state that support for PLAN and PLAAF aviation units lacks jointness, especially when multiple 
aircraft types are being supported. Each service still relies on its own organic support instead of 
making greater employment of common-use carriers. As a result, units undergoing projection out to 
distant islands and reefs have “long tails” due to slow transport procedures and difficulties in 
embarkation and debarkation.148 
There also appears to be problems in determining who is responsible for commanding and activating 
China’s strategic projection forces. The division of responsibilities and procedures between newly-
created transport and projection departments in Theater Commands and those in the JLSF for 
supporting joint operations has not been determined.149 Unclear command and activation authority 
over civilian forces could negatively impact the effectiveness and speed of strategic projection 
support forces.   
The PLA recognizes this issue and is contemplating ways to resolve it. Coordinating the various 
transport forces of the JLSF, services, and local civilian resources for strategic projection will require 
higher-level command authority. Lacking coordination and effective communication between the 
transport departments of the services and local military commands means that important missions 
must be led at the CMC-level. This solution is widely discussed by PLA experts. PLAAF officers 
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from the Southern Theater Command advocated in 2017 for the concentration of command authority 
for strategic projection operations in the CMC Transport and Projection Department with inter-
service coordination primarily conducted by Theater Command transport and projection departments. 
Theater Command transport and projection departments would also coordinate with the mobilized 
forces generated by local transportation war readiness offices in their jurisdictions.150  
Another major challenge for the PLA is in the integration of operational and support command 
systems that will enable rapid precision support. As one observer from the Southern Theater 
Command put it, “the front and rear should operate on one network, using a single platform for 
command, while looking at the same operating picture.”151 In supporting projection operations, 
civilian carriers will be operating under the PLA’s command and logistics networks. Precise 
allocation of civilian carriers to meet transportation demand will prove difficult if the PLA is unable 
to successfully integrate these systems. The resulting gaps in information and awareness would 
hinder the provision of support in real-time. However, technical capabilities for implementing unified 
control of the transport and projection forces are currently under development. 
The CMC Logistics Support Department has taken the lead on developing these capabilities. One of 
its research projects—entitled “Key Technologies in a Planning, Command, and Simulation Platform 
for Transport and Projection in Joint Operations”—is expected to be completed by the end of 2019. 
The objective of this project is to provide informatized and intelligent methods of support for 
command planning of transport and projection in joint operations. It seeks seamless integration of 
joint operational command systems and the military’s transportation monitoring systems. This 
project will integrate data from a vast network of sources to provide solutions in route planning, plan 
dissemination, in-transit visibility, simulated exercises, simulation evaluation, operations feedback, 
and a host of other functions that will directly support PLA-wide transportation capabilities.152 
Greater tracking of inventories and sites could allow planners to run simulations of potential 
scenarios involving the movement of large volumes of PLA forces and materials for power 
projection operations, which will prove essential to understanding how much force will be available 
at a specific point in time.153 These capabilities are fundamental to assisting decision makers in 
assessing the volume of lift required and the quantity of civilian carriers that will need to be activated 
ahead of time to better meet requirements for power projection missions. 
The PLA itself may not be prepared to fully embrace the diverse options presented by the strategic 
projection support forces. As the PLA transitions towards “all-domain” operations, services like the 
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PLA Army are working to become a “projection-type” (投送型) force.154 Greater mobility for power 
projection operations will require increased use of diverse civilian transportation services. However, 
PLA experts explain that many units are still heavily reliant on rail transport due to their 
unfamiliarity with aviation transport methods. They choose rail transport over air when possible due 
to “traditional thinking.”155 Advocates in the PLA call for combined arms units to avail themselves of 
different kinds of transportation modes and adopt new projection methods whereby personnel and 
equipment are transported using separate means to the same location (人装分运、目的地结合). Unit 
commanders previously emphasized the transport of personnel and equipment together (人装合运) in 
order to rapidly regain combat readiness on arrival. Such modes favored the PLA’s domestic 
defensive missions in the past, but are poorly suited to overseas operations that will rely on moving 
personnel via air lift and equipment and materials via land and sea transport.156 PLA commanders 
will need to leave the comfort of traditional transport modes for a more complex mix of sea and air 
lift where different force components are in transit at varying rates. They will need to learn how to 
reassemble and restore combat forces at points of debarkation in far-away locations.   
Facing these challenges and lacking experience in conducting long-range power projection 
operations, the PLA will be strenuously challenged to meet the goals for global projection outlined 
earlier in this report by CMC Transport and Projection Bureau head Liu Jiasheng. Nonetheless, 
strategic projection receives top-level leadership attention and is an area of increasing focus in PLA 
research and development. As the PLA builds toward fulfilling its missions and tasks in protecting 
PRC interests wherever they extend, the civilian forces supporting this longer reach will be crucial to 
enabling and sustaining those operations. The creation of numerous strategic projection support 
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